Toronto Bought the Shots. Columbus Bought the Points.

Five days in, the scoreboard has an opinion. Matthew Knies scored twice and added an assist in his first game for Columbus, a 6-3 win over Buffalo, and became the first player to score twice in a Blue Jackets debut. Kirill Marchenko has one point in two games for Toronto, which is 1-2.

Ignore all of that. One game tells you nothing, and the argument about this trade was never going to be settled by October. What the numbers can settle is a narrower question that most of the reaction has skipped: what each club actually bought. The two players finished last season one point apart. Underneath that, they are about as different as two 60-point wingers can be.

In August we argued that Columbus should hang up on every Marchenko call. Columbus picked up. This is what came back.

What did each team give up?

The deal was announced on 29 September. Toronto took on two other contracts. Columbus took a depth forward, a young defenceman and a pick.

Then the money. Marchenko signed a six-year, $75 million extension with Toronto that starts next season, a cap hit of $12.5 million. Knies is in the second year of a six-year, $46.5 million deal at $7.75 million a season. From 2027-28 Toronto is paying $4.75 million a year more for its side of the swap, and it is paying it for a winger who is more than two years older. Marchenko turned 26 in July. Knies turns 24 on 17 October.

Why do their box scores look identical?

Because on the surface they are. Here are last season's lines side by side, all situations first, then five-on-five.

Knies actually produced more at five-on-five per minute. If you stop at points, Toronto gave away the more efficient scorer and agreed to pay more for the privilege. That is the case being made loudly this week, and it is half the picture.

Where does the gap actually show up?

In everything that happens before a point is recorded. Rank the 386 forwards who played at least 500 five-on-five minutes last season and the two players separate immediately.

Knies ranked 23rd from the bottom of that group in on-ice expected goals share, at 42.7 per cent. When he was on the ice at five-on-five, Toronto was outscored 58-44 and out-chanced 54.1 to 40.3 in expected goals. He produced points anyway, 38 of them with 17 primary assists, but he produced them inside shifts that mostly went the wrong way.

Marchenko is the mirror. He took 309 shot attempts at five-on-five, almost double Knies's 162, and put 141 on goal to Knies's 80. Columbus outscored opponents 51-37 with him on the ice.

Is that fair to Knies, given the team around him?

Partly, and the fair part matters. Toronto was one of the worst five-on-five teams in hockey, at 45.6 per cent of expected goals, and its goaltending was 31st in the league at stopping what it faced. Most Leafs had ugly on-ice numbers. Auston Matthews was at 46.9 per cent.

Even so, Knies was worse than the team without him by about four points of share, and that is the number that travels. Marchenko, on a Columbus team that controlled play, was roughly neutral against his own team's baseline. One player was a passenger on a bad team who still scored. The other was a driver on a decent one.

What was Toronto actually paying for?

Shot volume and a right-handed release. John Chayka described Marchenko as one of "very few that can impact winning and can singlehandedly dictate the outcome of games", and while that is a general manager selling his own trade, the shot data is the honest version of the same claim. A team that finished in the bottom four in five-on-five expected goals share does not need another winger who rides along. It needs someone who forces the puck toward the net.

That is what the $12.5 million buys. It is a lot, and if Marchenko's attempt rate falls off in a Toronto system that suppressed most players' numbers last season, it will look like a lot very quickly. But it is a payment for something Toronto measurably did not have.

What was Columbus actually paying for?

Cost control and age. Columbus general manager Don Waddell said the club "truly" believes the deal makes it better "today and moving forward", and the forward part is the strongest piece of his case. Knies is 23, signed at $7.75 million for five more seasons, and plays a heavy game, with 145 hits last season to Marchenko's 58. On a Columbus team that already generates plenty of play through Adam Fantilli and Charlie Coyle, who had three assists in the debut, Knies does not have to drive a line. He has to finish what others start, which is the part of the game he did well even in Toronto.

The case for Columbus, stated fairly

Columbus's side of it is strong. Knies is younger, cheaper by $4.75 million a year from 2027-28, and scored at the 80th percentile per minute at 5-on-5 in a system that buried most of its forwards. He scored 29 goals the season before. His on-ice numbers were dragged down by goaltending that ranked 31st and a team share of 45.6 per cent, and he now joins a club at 52 per cent that will put better possession around him.

Toronto's answer is just as clear. Points are the noisiest thing a forward produces and shot generation is among the most stable. Knies sat in the 10th percentile for shot attempts and the 24th for individual chances, and his on-ice share was 23rd lowest among 386 forwards. Marchenko sat in the 90th and 71st and was neutral against a good team. Toronto bought the more repeatable skill and paid for it.

Toronto got the better hockey player. Columbus got the better contract. Over the next two seasons the first matters more, and after that the price gap starts to bite.

What it means

This trade will be graded on points for months, because points are what show up on the broadcast. Knies's debut will be replayed, and Marchenko's quiet first week will be used against him. Neither tells you anything yet.

The two numbers worth checking at the 20-game mark are simple. If Marchenko is still taking shots at the rate he did in Columbus, around a 90th-percentile pace, Toronto has what it paid for. If Knies's on-ice share climbs toward Columbus's team level of 52 per cent, he was never the problem, and Toronto sold low on a cheap 23-year-old. You can track both on Pucky's compare tool and in the trade tracker.

My view: Toronto made the right trade at a painful price. It needed what Marchenko does more than it needed what Knies does, and it had nowhere else to get it.